L-1011 Accidents and Incidents

Accident description (ASN).

Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript.

Accident description (ASN).

During final approach the #2 engine was shut down and the Captain told the cabin crew not to evacuate. The aircraft landed at Riyadh runway 01, taxied to a taxiway and then the crew told the tower that they would shut down the engines and evacuate. The engines were shut down but no evacuation was initiated so the fire and rescue personnel tried to open the doors. After 23 minutes (aircraft still pressurized) they managed to open R2 door. All 301 onboard were killed, the cause of the fire was never established.

Accident description (ASN).

Accident description (AD).

When climbing through 15000 ft they got a low oil pressure light for the #3 engine. The Captain retarded the #3 throttle slightly and reduced the rate of climb. Then the #1 engine low oil pressure light illuminated. The gauges at the Flight Engineerīs panel showed that the oil pressure on both operating engines were low and falling and that all quantity gauges indicated zero. Since the risk of this happening is very slim the crew considered indication problems. They levelled off at 16000 ft at 300 kt and told ATC about their problems. ATC cleared them direct to Miami and speed was reduced to 230 kt.

Then, with no warning, the #3 engine failed. They were now flying on one engine. They radioed Miami and was cleared for a straight-in approach for runway 27L, still with 70 miles to go. They started a descend and also began dumping fuel. The weather at Miami was good and the crew now realized that the gauges were functioning properly. At 12000 ft also #1 engine failed. They were now 55 miles from Miami with no engines at all running. The rate of descend increased to 1600 ft/min with a speed of 225 kt and the crew now tried to restart engine #2 through windmilling. It did not start.

The cabin was prepared for ditching. The Captain would set it down on the water with the landing gear retracted, normal landing flaps and with the nose pitched up at 12 degrees. That would probably torn off the wing engines, flaps and horizontal stabiliser. The aircraft would still be expected to stay afloat for 20-25 minutes.

There was little hope of any successful restart of the wing engines but the crew tried it anyway, with no success. Now an airstarter assisted restart of engine #2 was carried out and at 4000 ft, still with 22 miles to Miami, it started. At 3000 ft they headed straight for runway 27L. On landing both engines #1 and #3 smoked badly bacause the fuel switches were still on from the previous start attempts and fuel was still beeing pumped. Fire bottles were discharged on both those engines.

The Captain asked for a tug to tow the aircraft away from the runway but was informed that there would be a delay for that. Then he tried to use the #2 engine only to find that there was no power available. The #2 engine failed on the runway.

The reason for all three engines losing all their oil was a magnetic chip detector replacement, on all engines, the previous night. The installed chip detectors were all missing their o-rings and when the engines were started they began to leak oil. A ten-second engine motoring was carried out at night to check for leaks but it was established later that a minimum of 30 seconds was required to get a leak with o-rings missing.

And about the start attempts on engine #2: The crew entered the chart incorrectly and tried a windmill start when an airstarter assisted one would be required. Later on, when they discovered that they needed airstarter assist the engine started. If they would have entered the chart correctly the first time - would the #2 engine have lasted all the way to Miami?

Read the full story in Stanley Stewartīs book "Emergency - Crisis on the Flight Deck".

Accident description (ASN).

Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript.

NTSB Animation download (1065kb).

Accident description (ASN).

The below AAIB report contain lotīs of technical details of L-1011 pressure bulkhead problems, including some info about this incident.

AAIB report.

The below AAIB report contain lotīs of technical details of L-1011 pressure bulkhead problems, including some info about this incident.

AAIB report.

The aircraft was prepared for what looked like a ditching and the Honolulu Coast Guard had been alerted for a possible intercept and resque operation. However, this was a lucky day, and they landed with very little fuel left onboard. The reason for the leak was a faulty fuel line.

Accident description (ASN).

Accident description (ASN).

In the cabin the crew also heard the bang (except for one attendant in lower galley) and felt pressure in their ears. The purser went to the Flight Engineer and told him that the oxygen masks were not deployed in the cabin. The F/E did that manually. The automatic system had not yet been activated because the cabin had not reached the preset altitude at that time. There was a smell of burning in the cabin because of the heat the oxygen generators produced.

The Captain levelled off at FL100 after a descent at a speed slightly less than the maximum operating speed. All system were found to be normal after the descend except for a "truck" light on the gear. The descend had been done with gear down.

At this time, the First Officer had established contact with Lisbon ATC. The aircraft position was approximately halfway between Tenerife and Faro so the Captain decided to divert to Faro. During the flight to Faro 4000 kg of fuel was dumped to bring the landing weight down to 160 000 kg.

The cabin was prepared for an emergency landing because of the landing gear "truck" light. As speed was reduced on final the "truck" light went out and the landing was normal.

The decompression was caused by a partial rupture (~300 x 400 mm) of the rear pressure bulkhead. The below AAIB report contain lotīs of technical details of this and other L-1011 pressure bulkhead problems.

AAIB report.

Accident description (ASN).

The Airport Fire Service reacted very rapidly and sprayed the engine with foam. The crew were initially unaware of this action. Engineering assessed that the engine had suffered thermal shock from the foam and that corrosion damage had possibly occured to the adjacent aircraft structure. The fuel flow regulator was believed to be faulty.

AAIB report.

NTSB report.

NTSB report.

During the takeoff roll, the 3F tire exploded, resulting in vibration, shudder, and yaw. The sudden instability, combined with a phantom C1 cargo door light, caused the Captain to abort. The abort was initiated about Vr (165 knots) with approximately 6,000 feet of runway remaining. As the aircraft came to a stop, the nose wheels were 164 feet short of the overrun area for runway 8R. A brake fire began while the aircraft was stopping and the captain directed an emergency evacuation.

The 2R and 4R doors failed to open, and the 4L and 3L doors were not used due to their proximity to the fire and smoke. The 4R door was jammed by a broken piece of backboard, and the 2R door malfunctioned due to a partially broken counterbalance spring. The flight attendant who attempted to open the 2R door did not attempt to manually lift the door. All evacuations were made through the 1L, 1R, 2L, and 3R doors.

Firefighters had difficulty communicating with the flight crew and in verifying the total number onboard because the airline's passenger count does not include lap children. A total of 56 passengers and 2 flight attendants were treated for minor injuries, while 1 passenger received a broken ankle. All injuries were attributed to the use of the slides. Passengers failed to follow flight attendants and attempted to evacuate with their carryons. The airline did not effectively supervise the passengers after the evacuation and several began walking toward an active runway.

An inspection of the 3R tire showed bead separation had occurred. The estimated bead temperatures during the takeoff roll reached between 350 and 400 degrees Fahrenheit. The bead begins to degrade between 250 and 280 degrees Fahrenheit.

NTSB report.

The aircraft slowed down on the runway, max speed had only been 68 kt, and taxied off and stopped on a high-speed exit. Fire and resque crew saw that smoke was coming from the leading edge of the tailplane and from a grill at the bottom of the fuselage. Cabin crew also reported light smoke entering the cabin in the rear.

A controlled evacuation was initiated using the two front slides on each side of the aircraft. It took 10 minutes to evacuate 357 passengers and 11 suffered minor injuries.

Examination showed that an elbow section of a large bore titanium duct, delivering air from No 2 engine bleed system, had blown out. This had caused secondary damage to adjacent hydraulic pipes in 'A' and 'B' systems which accounted for the observed hydraulic system failures. Further examination showed that the failure had been caused by a massive over pressurisation of the air duct.

AAIB report.

The flight was originating at the time of the incident. According to officials from the Government of Panama, the captain elected to use a runway that was 2,000 feet shorter than the longer of the parallel runways. During the takeoff after the nose landing gear was rotated the captain elected to abort. After touchdown all main landing gear tires were blown and the airplane was stopped on the runway.

NTSB preliminary report.

The DFDR was malfunctioning and contained no data. A final approach profile could still be constructed using height calls from the CVR and recorded radar data. That profile showed that the rate of descend increased below 100 ft AGL and that the flare appeared to be ineffective.

Company procedures was that the Captain prepared the loadsheet, in lbs, and the Flight Engineer calculated Take Off and Landing Data Cards. At the departure station all figures were given in kilos. They were converted to lbs except for passenger weight which was still in the kilo figure on the loadsheet. This meant that the aircraft was 22 000 lbs heavier than the loadsheet figure. The correct VREF for the landing should have been 136 kt.

On the previous sector the loadsheet contained exactly the same mistake but that approach was flown by the other pilot at a slightly higher speed with a normal landing.

AAIB report.

Maintenace personnel was called for and down in the MESC, they found two wire bundles, about 3 inches in diameter, that were burnt. The wire bundles were coloured blue from leaking toilet fluid. The wire bundles were repaired and the aircraft was back in service after 6 days.

The mid toilets on Delta aircraft have a "low charge level" and therefor have an increased risk of beeing overfilled. In that case the excessive fluid may end up on electrical wiring.

Delta Airlines now has a "Special Inspection" of the wires, the toilet drip pan and the drain tubes in the MESC. There has been a great number of reports of fluid, dirt, dust and metal debris in the inspection area.

NTSB preliminary report.