7. The fight for respect

A special bureau was organized to supervise these farms. The military colonies were self-supporting and the regions blossomed, this would finally mean that Khubilai secured his efforts to get a strong base in China. Khubilai were offered new appanage by his brother, Khubilai started in these regions among other things a Pacifying Bureau and an office that printed paper money to further trade. In this way, Khubilai became increasingly involved in China since his economic and political success became so dependant on how well his Chinese territories did. At the same time, he also began to slip more and more from the ways and customs of his ancestors. But Khubilai was and would so remain a Mongol, despite the need for assimilating some Chinese views and customs to rule successfully. Later during the year of 1252 CE, were Khubilai to become even more involved in the Chinese affairs after that Möngke had ordered him to make the kingdom Ta-li to be under Mongol jurisdiction.

The kingdom of Ta-li consisted of many non-Chinese people, but the Chinese had been moving into this area for centuries. Logically seen, this was the next step for the Chinese expansion, since control of this territory would make it possible for them to pursue trade with Burma and South Asia. The conquest of Ta-li was in that way not just a goal for the Mongolians, it would surely have been a primary target for any of the Chinese dynasties. Even if Khubilai got Möngkes order in July 1252 CE, he still did not move against Ta-li until September 1253 CE. Khubilai made thorough preparations for his military campaigns and left nothing to chance. He had the opinion that his troops must be prepared for any obstacle they would face and that a rich supply should be near at hand. The preparations of the military campaign against Ta-li were especially important, this was Khubilais first great assignment. When he was 36 years old, he had finally received a great responsibility for an important military objective. His father and his brother, Möngke, had received leaderships over expeditions when they were still teenagers or in their twenties. Because Khubilais opportunity to display his own leadership capabilities did not appear until he had reached a more mature age, he did not want to loose this important opportunity.

Two of the most talented people in the Mongol territories followed with Khubilai to Ta-li. Uriyangkhadai, son of Subötei, one of Chingis Khans great generals, received the responsibility to lead one of the armies southwest, while the Confucian teacher Yao Shu traveled with his patron and employer Khubilai to Ta-li, an area that the Chinese considered to have an inferior culture. Uriyangkhadai had received much greater experience of war in close range and proved himself indispensable in this war. Late during the summer of 1253 CE, Khubilai felt ready to start his campaign against Ta-li. He gathered his troops at Lin-t’ao in the northwestern province of Shensi and began the long march south. To reach the plateau of Yünnan, Khubilai and his army had to get through rocky rough country. They had to travel through Sichuan to arrive at the valley of the kingdom of Ta-li, which was surrounded and provided by three great rivers: Salween, upper Mekong and the Yangtze River.

During his stay in Lin-t’ao, Khubilai sent three emissaries to demand the king of Ta-li to surrender. Known as Tuan Hsing-chih by the Chinese, he was a king with no real power, the one who had the real power was held by his leading minister, Kao T’ai-hsiang. It was up to Kao to answer the demands of Khubilai. His answer would show to be catastrophic for him and Ta-li: he had the three emissaries put to death.

Because of the circumstances, Khubilai had no other choice but to start punitive expeditions against Ta-li. Khubilais strategy to conquer Ta-li was deceivingly simple: Uriyangkhadai and his army would attack from the west against Ta-li. Khubilai and his army would make a frontal assault while a group of princes and their troops would attack from the east. This three-sided attack began in the end of October 1253 CE. Khubilai presumed that it would be a bloody war to force Ta-li to surrender. Kao T’ai-hsiang refused obstinately to surrender to Mongolian armies and gathered instead his armies at the river of Yangtze where they awaited the arrival of their enemies. Khubilai and his troops arrived to the opposite side of the river in November, and, without intimidation from the armies that waited on the other side, Khubilai ordered his soldiers to build rafts of sheepskins bags to be able to cross the river.

Bayan, one of the generals that followed Khubilai, supervised the construction of the rafts. This was the first time that Khubilai and Bayan, who would become one of Khubilais most trustworthy and able military advisor, worked together. Bayan lead his troops in a daring crossing of the river in the night and the Mongolians swiftly vanquished the surprised enemy, which forced Kao to quickly escape back to the capitol and the major part of his army were killed. Khubilai could now go in for the coup de grace against the capitol. He sent once again emissaries who said that if they surrendered, no one would come to harm. With these guaranties Ta-li chose to give up and Khubilai kept his word, he only executed those officials that were responsible for the execution of his emissaries. Khubilais troops now occupied the capitol without greater opposition. During nightfall, Kao T’ai-hsiang tried to escape, but he did not get far. Two of Khubilais military commanders captured Kao, but he would not give his capturers the satisfaction to be humiliated in front of them. Khubilai was offended by the arrogance of Kao T’ai-hsiang and executed Kao by decapitation. Khubilai did not depose the ruling government but let them share the power with Khubilais acting official, Liu Shih-chung, who had received the title Pacification emissary. Khubilai also offered oxen’s and grain to the population of Ta-li before he returned to Northern China.

The brilliant general Uriyangkhadai stayed behind to continue the campaign in the southwest and he was so successful that most of the area soon was under Mongol control. Uriyangkhadai pacified several tribes in the southwest, he even dared to venture into Tibet. In the year 1257 CE, he had turned eastwards to conquer Annam. But the heat, jungle and the insects all took their toll on his troops and the battles against the Annamneses were not decisive. Even if he briefly occupied Hanoi, Uriyangkhadai were not so victorious here as he had been in the southwestern parts. But despite this, he got the promise from the ruler of Annam to pay tax to the Mongolian court, probably because the ruler wanted the Mongolian troops out of his country. In this way, with the help of Uriyangkhadai, was Khubilais first military campaign a complete success. He had accomplished that what Möngke had asked for. He had expanded the Mongolian control into important regions – a base from which one could start an attack against Southern China and a through route for an expansion of the trade with Burma and India.

Khubilai had earned his spurs in the traditional Mongolian way, through a military campaign. His older brother Möngke had his initiation in the western campaigns in the 1230’s CE. Even if Khubilais expedition was not as vast, it was nonetheless successful.  To be accepted as a leader, a Mongol had to prove his abilities as a warrior and all that comes with that territory, and Khubilai had now taken a large step ahead in his ambition to get the respect that he wanted from the Mongolian nobles. After showing his courage and his abilities in warfare, Khubilai could now concentrate on the administrations of his appanage. As a byproduct from the campaign against Ta-li, these had grown so that they now consisted of the provinces of Shensi and Honan of today’s China.

A stable administration was now necessary for such an expanded territory. When Khubilai had made sure that capable officials governed his domains, he could now focus on more long-term plans.

He had among other things the help of a Buddhist monk by the name Liu Ping-chung, whom Khubilai often consulted. Liu came with several advises, some were to restore the traditional Chinese traditions when it came to the Chinese scholars and if they could get a better position in the domains of Khubilai. Schools were to be opened, old Chinese customs and music styles were to be restored. Another proposition was that Khubilai would order to write down the history of the conquered Jurchen Chin dynasty.

Khubilai agreed to all with two exceptions. He was against the reinstitution of the importance of the Confucians in the society since that would mean that he would become more dependent of them. Khubilai wanted greater flexibility and had no intentions to depend too much on the Chinese officials. He also denied temporarily the suggestion of the history recordings of the last dynasty. Khubilai was after all, not a ruler of the Mongolian domains or emperor of China. It was not up to him to order the compilation of a dynasties history. The one person that had the authority to make such a demand was Möngke, if anyone. Liu must surely have understood that Khubilai would not have the authority to carry out this proposal and it is hard to understand why he even bothered to suggest it to Khubilai. Did Liu believe he could influence Möngke through his younger brother? Did he believe that Khubilai would become Khaghan?

Anyway, Khubilai and his advisors now had several years of respite from the wars and they now had the time to start on a grand project that would demonstrate Khubilais growing affection and caring for his Chinese subjects: the building of a capitol within the new domains of Khubilai. Some Chinese sources believe that it was Liu who got the idea to build a capitol, other sources mentions nothing of his involvement in this decision. Khubilai’s own contribution should not be left out, he probably needed little if any persuasion to recognize the importance that the construction of such a center would give. The area they chose as a building site was north of the Luan River. It took about ten days with horse from Beijing along the edge of the Chinese farming border and the Mongolian pastures. The city came to lie near To-lun in today’s Inner Mongolia. Traditional Mongolians could not really accuse Khubilai for abandoning his ancestral heritage and instead had taken position for the Chinese people, since many of the Mongolian princes had built their own cities out on the steppes.

But Khubilai did signal a change to the advantage of his Chinese subjects after all, when he in 1256 CE ordered Liu Ping-chung to select a place for the city in accordance to the ancient Chinese method of reading the natures signs that is called Fengshui (wind and water). This method was used by the Taoist sign readers to keep ill minded spirits away. It is not clear, whether Khubilai considered this new city as his capitol or if it was just a summer residence. He originally named the city to K’ai-p’ing, but in 1263 CE he renamed it to Shang-tu (Upper capitol), in opposite of Chung-tu (Central capitol), which was the contemporary name for Beijing.

Yet another signal to Khubilai’s subjects were that he built the city after old Chinese capitols from the days before. Apart from a well-sized game preserve, which was a Mongolian custom, most buildings were influenced of Chinese building styles. The city was divided in three sections. The Outer city, the first of these sections, was square shaped that was surrounded by a earth wall, about three to four meters high. Each side of the outer square was about 1,400 meters long, two gates each were on the east and west sides and one on the north and south side allowed entrance to the city. Six watchtowers were built on each side of the surrounding walls. The largest part of the population lived in the outer city in houses of clay or planks, it is estimated that about 100,000 people lived there. Furthermore, there were also several Buddhist temples in the outer city.

The next section was the Inner city, which consisted of Khubilais and his courts residences. Just like the Outer city, the city was planned like a square, even if the sides were not a like. From east to west, it measured about 560 meters and from north to south, it measured about 615 meters. A brick wall that was 3-4 meters high enclosed the entire Inner city, four watchtowers were built on each side of the square. Khubilais palace was built along the northern wall, in Chinese known as Ta-an Ko (the Pavilion of Great Harmony). It was built on a platform made of dirt and that had been strengthened by wooden poles because the ground was somewhat marshy. The platform measured about 150 meters from east to west and about 45 meters from north to south. The splendid palace of marble that Marco Polo was so impressed by was built on this platform. Other palaces and other administrational buildings were scattered around in the Inner city.

The third section was the great hunting reserve of about 64 square kilometers. This reserve was situated northwest of the Outer city and consisted of meadows, forests and streams. A wall made of dirt contained the park and moats were outside the wall. Four gates on each side led into the park. Very little of this magnificent park made by man have survived to our time. The forests, streams and buildings are all gone. It is only through Marco Polo’s description that brings this park to life. According to Marco Polo, there were many fountains and streams scattered across the landscape. A variety of domesticated animals were kept, especially deer, in the park for the hunting parties that Khubilai Khan enjoyed so much.

K’ai-p’ing was in many ways built on an ideal place, during the summer it was much cooler there than in Northern China and when Khubilai once became the Khaghan he spent June, July and August there, away from the sultry heat in Beijing. It is hard to say if Khubilai thought of K’ai-p’ing as his capitol or just as a summer residence. However he viewed these places, he was inevitable on his way to the life and the values that his resident subjects had. Just as inevitable was Khubilais choice a cause to opposition.

Those Mongolians that was followers to the traditional customs was disturbed by his seemingly preferential attitude against the Chinese, from this moment on those followers began to oppose Khubilai’s politics. This dividing weakened the Mongolians and undermined their efforts to rule over the great areas that they had conquered. Khubilai seemed to have succumbed to the different attractions of the Chinese culture. Mongolian traditionalists thought that his favoring of the Chinese traditions was a threat against their own customs and because of that, they wanted to overthrow Khubilai before he could change their customary nomadic life.

Möngke surely had his own reasons to listen to these accusations of his younger brothers pro-Chinese and possibly treacherous attitudes. But even more important than these petty accusations were the fear that Khubilai was identified with his subjects. This meant that Khubilai might get such a great power that he could be a serious threat in the future. Möngke’s officials tried several times to awaken Möngkes suspicions against his younger brother. They accused Khubilai for using Chinese laws in the administration of his domains and to deter from the traditional Mongolian norms. Möngke still thought of Karakorum as his capitol and Mongolia as the center of the Mongol Empire, but the establishment of Khubilai’s grand residence in the settled areas in China surely annoyed many of the more traditional Mongolians. Möngke must have been persuaded to eliminate this grave threat that his brother represented. So, in 1257 CE, he sent two officials to Khubilai’s domains to inspect the collection of taxes. The real cause for the inspection was to find evidence that could lead to the fall of Khubilai, if they did not find any evidence, they were supposed to manufacture it themselves. After a quick inspection of the tax registries, the officials said that they had found numerous faults in the books. They immediately gathered a crowd of high officials and executed them, with no trial whatsoever.

Those Chinese officials with strong connections to the larger Mongolian nobles escaped this fate. But others were not so fortunate, even if there exists no evidence of such a bloodbath. The Mongolian officials aimed for reducing the number of Chinese officials in the local administrations. This purge would surely continue until Khubilai himself was threatened. He had already had some of his obligations removed, among those the important right to collect taxes. It seemed now that Khubilai’s position in the Mongolian hierarchy was very insecure. Now Khubilai had few choices, he could go against his brother, throw out Möngke’s emissaries, and then wait for the consequences. Möngke would probably answer with a punitive expedition to crush his obstinate younger brother. This war between brothers would surely weaken the Mongolians and probably lead to a defeat for Khubilai. Khubilai had little hope of getting any larger support from the Mongolian princes, since he in their eyes was the disobedient, rebellious younger brother. This choice was therefore most impractical for Khubilai. Khubilai’s advisors suggested therefore that Khubilai himself would travel to his brother’s court in Karakorum to face the accusations against him. They also recommended that he would not get into the political issues but plead to Möngke as brother to brother. Khubilai’s decision to follow his advisors guidance could not have come more convenient.

In January 1258 CE, Möngke found himself between two issues that could divide his empire. First, there was a religious conflict between Buddhists and Taoists, which had escalated to almost a warlike state, destruction of temples, monasteries and the confiscation of holy objects. Möngke was in need of reconciliation or at least some stability in his empire to achieve his political and economical goals. The other issue was to conquer southern China, without any doubt the richest region of China. The conquest of this are would not only let Möngke to seem more powerful to the Chinese but also improve his presence towards Chinese scholars and the Chinese officials, whose country had not been united in 300 years. Both of these issues involved China, which was Khubilai’s chief concern, and without Khubilai’s assistance, Möngke feared that he would have severe problems in the handling of the Chinese people. Khubilai had gained great esteem in northern China and many Chinese had great confidence in him. Therefore, Möngke could not really afford to continue his disputes with his brother. Khubilai’s arrival at the court in Karakorum meant an end of this, instead they made a joint cause against the empire of the Song dynasty.